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Abstract
A woman who carries the gene for fragile X syndrome (FXS) has a 50 per cent chance per
pregnancy of passing the gene to her sons and daughters. In this paper we analyse interview data
from mothers who are carriers of the FX gene, and who have at least one child with FXS, to
examine how their understandings and enactments of reproductive options, obligations, and
responsibilities support an expanded notion of genetic responsibility. Accounts of 108 women
from across the United States show that the majority of mothers chose not to have another
biological child once they learned their carrier status. They discussed genetic responsibility and
reproductive agency in terms of an obligation not to risk having another child who carried the
gene, although their accounts reflected the tensions that arose from managing oneself as a
genetically at-risk actor. Another 22 mothers either purposefully became pregnant or continued an
unplanned pregnancy after finding out their carrier status. These mothers' accounts reflect an
expanded version of genetic responsibility that incorporates ideas and values beyond managing
risk in what it means to act responsibly in light of genetic knowledge.
Keywords
responsibility; fragile X syndrome; reproductive decisions; genetic citizenship
Introduction
We're sitting on the edge of the genetic revolution and we're gonna basically choose
not to have these children or we're going to manipulate our genes so that we all
become intellectual people. Diane (all person names are pseudonyms)—mother of
three boys with fragile X syndrome.
In the current `age of genomics', individuals increasingly encounter and use genetic tests and
explanations of genetic risk to assess and manage their own and their family's health.
Following detection of a genetic disorder, especially one caused by an alteration in a single
gene where inheritance patterns and penetrance are relatively well understood (e.g. fragile X
syndrome, Huntington's, Tay-Sachs), an individual faces an array of difficult decisions, such
as to determine one's responsibility to inform relatives, make reproductive decisions, and
monitor individual and family health, using genetic information. The purpose of this paper is
to examine how women who carry the gene for fragile X syndrome (FXS), the most
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common inherited cause of intellectual disability, construct and enact such notions of
genetic responsibility on personal, familial, and social levels.
Genetic responsibility and citizenship are concepts discussed in a growing body of social
science literature on how individuals are impacted by genetic risk, technologies, and
surveillance. In much of this literature, the genetically responsible citizen is presented as one
who makes use of genetic information to manage her own and family's health. This
exemplary genetic subject informs relatives who may also be at risk, chooses not to take a
chance of passing on a genetic disorder, and incorporates personal risk information into a
sense of being genetically at risk (Fitzgerald 2008, Kerr and Cunningham-Burley 2000,
Lemke 2004, Nelkin 1996, Robertson 2000). In this framework, genetically at-risk
individuals have an obligation to actively manage the self in light of knowledge revealed by
genetic tests and explained by medical/clinical genetics (Novas and Rose 2000). An
apparent `choice' to use genetic information and diagnostic testing is thus experienced as an
obligation, as the responsible citizen feels compelled to use this information to engage in
self-surveillance (Etorre 2002, Kerr 2003) and to manage her extended family's present and
future health (Polzer 2005, Polzer et al. 2002, Raspberry and Skinner 2007).
This sense of genetic responsibility becomes most salient at times of making reproductive
decisions, when the genetically at-risk individual is faced with the possibility of passing on
the defective gene (Parsons and Atkinson 1992). Several studies suggest that for most
people, genetic responsibility is enacted by not passing the gene to their children—either by
using genetic testing to select for an unaffected embryo or foetus, or by choosing not to have
children (Arribas-Ayllon et al. 2008a, Downing 2005, Hallowell 1999, Kelly 2009). Carriers
who unintentionally pass on a genetic condition often hold themselves responsible for
causing the problems of those affected by it. While this responsibility may translate into
feelings of guilt or blame (Hallowell et al. 2006, Kay and Kingston 2002), at least initially,
it may also translate into a form of genetic citizenship as individuals become lay experts in
their particular genetic condition and join with others to advocate for targeted research and
services (Heath et al. 2004, Rose and Novas 2005).
Other studies on gendered dimensions of reproductive decision making show how women
are held primarily accountable for the health of the foetus, and for making definitive
decisions about prenatal testing and childbearing (Ivry 2007, Locock and Alexander 2006,
Markens et al. 2003, Rapp 1999, Reed 2009, Saukko 2004). This research coupled with
discussions of genetic responsibility suggest that the genetically responsible woman uses
diagnostic information in a preventative fashion both for her own and her extended family's
health and reproduction.
While these studies portray the genetically responsible person as one who singularly
prioritises genetic risk and identity in everyday health and life decisions, others present more
complexity and a broader notion of biocitizenship. For instance, Plows and Boddington
(2006) critique an exclusively biomedical version of biocitizenship and argue in favour of a
more varied conceptualisation that locates genetic citizenship within an interaction of
diverse and multiple identity claims and responsibilities. Also, Novas and Rose (2000: 507),
though writing on the significance of genetic information for individuals, note that people
formulate decisions and strategies within a complex ethical field, informed by multiple
perspectives and practices that go beyond biological and medical ones.
A number of empirical studies demonstrate this complexity. For example, Arribas-Ayllon et
al. (2008b) examine how nuanced family bonds affect the disclosure of genetic information.
In their research on late onset Alzheimer's disease, Lock and colleagues (Lock et al. 2006,
Lock et al. 2007) show how genetic risk information does not override, but rather
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supplements already existing causal explanations for disease and inheritance. Kelly (2009),
who notes the paucity of studies on the reproductive choices of parents who already have a
child with an inherited condition, found that prenatal decisions made by these parents offers
a version of `responsible parenting' in which they refused to structure their reproductive
choices solely on risk estimates and diagnostic tests. Rapp (2000) also compellingly portrays
how genetic diagnosis is only one element in the ways that parents make sense of, contest,
and participate in biomedical discourse on Down Syndrome. She writes that their
understandings reveal how `[r]eligious orientations and practices, informal folk beliefs,
class-based and ethnic traditions as well as scientifically inflected counter discourses also
lay claim to the interpretation of extra chromosomes' (Rapp 2000: 206).
Taken together, this literature indicates the complex and situationally-dependent aspects of
genetic responsibility. We add to this literature an empirical investigation of the ways in
which 108 mothers of children with FXS enact genetic responsibility. These women
constitute a group for whom reproductive decisions are highly salient and an object of their
own and others' surveillance. FXS is not life threatening but it poses some challenges to
those who have it and to their families. FXS is a single gene disorder caused by mutation of
the FMR1 gene on the X chromosome. A female carrier has a 50 per cent chance per
pregnancy of her children inheriting the gene, either in its premutation or full mutation state.
Males with FXS have moderate to severe intellectual disabilities, a range of language
disorders, and social and behavioral difficulties, including problems with attention,
impulsivity, anxiety, and arousal. About one-third also meet the diagnostic criteria for
autism (see Bailey et al. 1998, Rogers et al. 2001). Females with FXS are overall less
severely affected, but may also exhibit intellectual impairments and other characteristics of
FXS.
In the following analysis, we explore through women's accounts how they talked about
responsibility in relation to their decisions to oppose, consider, or actively pursue having
another biological child and the ambivalences they felt in making such choices We conclude
with a discussion of how women's varied and sometimes contradictory understandings of
what it means to be a responsible reproductive actor, mother, and citizen bring to light the
complex and heterogeneous enactments of genetic responsibility in everyday life.
The study
The data analysed here are drawn from a series of semi-structured interviews conducted with
108 families from across the United States who participated in a mixed-methods study
designed to assess family adaptations to FXS (see Bailey et al. 2008, Roberts et al. 2009,
Wheeler et al. 2008). Selection criteria were that the mother had to have at least one
biological child under the age of 15 diagnosed with full mutation FXS (children do not
inherit the full mutation from the father though all daughters of a male carrier are also
carriers). Fifty-six per cent of the families were recruited through existing studies at the
University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill and the university's online FXS participant
research registry; 16 per cent were recruited from a FXS parent listserv and family support
groups; and 28 per cent were recruited through other investigators in the field of FXS who
gave our recruitment materials to participants in their studies. Recruitment material invited
participation in a study that examines how families' lives are affected by having a child with
FXS to learn more about sources of support, perceptions, resources, and family adaptations.
Interested families contacted the study co-ordinator via a toll-free telephone call, e-mail, or
return of a pre-paid response card. Mothers provided written informed consent for their own
and their child's participation. This recruitment strategy resulted in families from 29 states in
the final sample. All regions of the US were represented.
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Mothers were the primary respondents. All but four women learned of their carrier status
when one of their children was diagnosed with FXS. Most women were still of reproductive
age at the time of finding out their carrier status, which made this genetic information
particularly relevant for continued family planning. Of the 108 women, only 21 had made an
explicit choice not to have another child before finding out their carrier diagnosis. Two-
thirds (66%) of the women had only one child with the full mutation FXS, 29 per cent had
two children with the full mutation, and six per cent had three children with the full
mutation. Of the 108 children who were the focus of the assessments, 91 (84%) were male.
Approximately one-third (32%) of the families were low-income (defined as below 200 per
cent of poverty guidelines). Eighty-four (77%) mothers were white, 21 (19%) African
American, two (2%) Hispanic, and one (1%) was of Middle Eastern descent.
Methods and analysis
Research assistants conducted three semi-structured interviews with the 108 mothers from
2003 to 2007. Mothers were interviewed initially as they joined the study, and again after 18
and 36 months about topics of interest to the larger project, including mothers'
understandings of FXS, their perceptions of their own and their children's quality of life,
child-rearing strategies, and sources of support. These interviews, each of which lasted
approximately 90 minutes, focused on how FXS affected decisions and family life and
included explicit questions about reproductive choices and plans. Interviews were conducted
in the family's home and were digitally recorded and transcribed verbatim.
To analyse how mothers talked about reproductive decisions and responsibility, both authors
thoroughly read and reread the first semi-structured interview to chart mothers' accounts of
the ramifications of learning about FXS, especially as related to reproductive options. For
each mother, the first author then systematically recorded and summarised in data display
matrices (Miles and Huberman 1994) the different ways in which their reproductive
decisions were influenced (or not) when they found out their carrier status, how they talked
about personal responsibility, and other experiences and meanings that came into play in
their discussions and decisions about reproduction and parenthood. The two authors then
reviewed all subsequent interviews for information pertaining to reproductive decisions and
women's reflections on and explanations of those decisions. We charted the reproductive
trajectory for each woman and used this information to classify women into the groups
described below. We compiled interview data on how women with different reproductive
trajectories negotiated and talked about reproductive responsibility and familial obligations:
how they reflected anew on their reproductive decisions, and how they justified their choices
with and against imagined audiences and perceptions of societal expectations. We extracted
themes within each mother's account and compared these to other women who shared the
same reproductive trajectory and to those who did not. We chronicled our evolving
interpretations of how women were constructing themselves as responsible actors using the
constant comparative method, modifying our interpretations in light of each account (Strauss
and Corbin 1990). In our analysis below, we report themes that were predominant in
women's accounts and select excerpts representative of these themes.
Enacting responsibility
In the following sections we examine women's accounts for the complexities, contradictions,
and ambivalences embedded in their experiences of being a responsible citizen, mother, and
member of an extended family. A related paper (Raspberry and Skinner 2010) focuses
specifically on the different reproductive paths that these women forged, which included
non-mutually-exclusive decisions to not have more biological children (83), adopt (6),
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undergo assisted reproductive and genetic technologies (6), use prenatal testing (17), and
have children irrespective of FX status (22).
Our aim in this study is to analyse women's understandings of responsibility as formulated
in their discussions with us about their reproductive choices and how they enacted being a
responsible reproductive actor. We first present how mothers who did not have more
children after carrier diagnosis constructed genetic responsibility. These women discussed
responsibility in terms of managing genetic risk by not taking the chance of passing on the
FX gene, though this decision was not without the complicated tensions that arise from
managing oneself as a genetically at-risk actor. We then turn to the accounts of 22 women
who, conscious of their 50 per cent chance of passing on the FX gene, either purposefully
initiated an unmediated pregnancy (10), or continued an `at-risk' unplanned pregnancy (12).
By `unmediated pregnancies' we refer to pregnancies in which prenatal testing and other
reproductive and genetic technologies were either not used, or were not used to avoid
passing on the FX gene. We find that in contrast to their counterparts, this latter group of
women did not frame responsibility in terms of monitoring genetic risk, but evoked other
forms of responsibility, such as the responsibility to love, care for, and for some, procreate
all children, regardless of their genetic status.
Not passing the gene
After finding out their carrier status, 77 per cent (83) of the mothers in this study chose not
to have a biological child who might carry the FX gene.1 They constructed genetic
responsibility at least in part as a commitment not to pass on the FX gene, either by not
reproducing, or by using reproductive and genetic technologies (preimplantation or prenatal)
to have a child who would not carry the gene.2 For example, Pamela, mother of two young
daughters who both have FXS, decided not to have more children when she found out she
was a carrier. She consciously talked about this decision as a `responsible' one, albeit one
that limited her envisioned family: `I love my children and I probably would love to have a
whole houseful of them but I said `You know what? I'm not going to do that. I'm going to be
responsible. Take care of the two I have'. Similarly, Katie, who adopted a daughter after her
son was diagnosed, characterised as reckless the act of having a biological child after
knowing one's carrier status. She explained, `I would have felt – I think it's – what's the
word? I think it's irresponsible. I would have felt irresponsible maybe if I had known this
was a possibility and maybe not considered it seriously and just plunged ahead'. By
increasing her family size through adoption rather than unmediated pregnancy, Katie viewed
herself as acting responsibly and thoughtfully.
Other mothers wanted more biological children, but discussed responsibility in terms of
using prenatal testing to prevent passing on the gene. Mary, who has two sons with FXS,
expressed a strong sense of individual responsibility to stop transmission of FXS:
My first husband was like, `Get sterilized. Get your tubes tied. Just forget it. The
way to deal with this is to not have any more kids. People should get diagnosed,
and the ones who have it shouldn't have children. That will get rid of it. That will
exterminate it from the population'. I always thought of that as being a little bit
Naziistic, but it is true. If you diagnose people, and if they are aware they have this
problem, and they don't have children, then, you will stop it.
1The 83 mothers includes 21 who said they were already done having children at the time of diagnosis, three who adopted after
diagnosis, and two who successfully used assisted reproductive technology (ART) techniques to have a biological child without
passing on the gene (IVF with PGD and IVF with donor eggs).
2In discussing the possibility of passing on the FX gene, mothers did not distinguish between full mutation FXS and carrier status. In
other words, the risk of passing on the gene was implicitly referred to as a risk of having a child with full mutation FXS.
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Although Mary recognised the eugenic potential of knowing one's carrier status—a prospect
particularly cautioned against by disability rights advocates and others—she also
characterised herself as having acted responsibly when she terminated an unplanned
pregnancy after testing indicated the foetus had the full mutation.3 For her as for the
majority of these mothers, being `responsible' included a commitment to prevent passing on
the FX gene.
Familial responsibility
In a similar vein, many of these women's understandings of genetic and reproductive
responsibility extended to a sense of obligation to immediate and distant relatives as well as
to potential future generations. Most participants identified the issue of whether and when to
inform relatives about the presence of the FX gene in the family as being a key facet of a
familial sense of genetic and reproductive responsibility. For many like Valerie, acting
responsibly entailed telling everyone in the family that two of her three sons had inherited
the FX gene that she carried, and letting them decide for themselves how to use the
information. She explained, `I just wanted everybody to be informed so I wouldn't feel
guilty later. They had a right to know'. While some mothers felt a moral obligation to inform
relatives that they may also be carriers, others believed it was their responsibility to protect
certain family members from that information. For example, Dawn did not want her mother
to know she was a carrier because she `would start blaming herself and would never get over
it'. Anne, who has one young son with FXS, told her mother but felt that she could not tell
her grandmother: `You have these grandchildren that are mentally retarded and you're the
reason why'. At the same time, Anne acknowledged that not disclosing this information
meant that her grandmother's siblings, their children, and grandchildren might remain
uninformed that they too could carry the FX gene and pass it on.
This sense of obligation to living relatives at times also extended to those as yet unborn.
Vicky, who was pregnant when her two sons were diagnosed, expressed this sense of
awareness and responsibility:
And that even if they are just a carrier and don't show any signs, that I think it's a
parent's responsibility to keep the wellbeing of your family for even generations to
come. So even if you're going to have a child that's just a carrier, are you going to
be able to deal with the fact that your grandkids are going to possibly have it?
Like the other mothers interviewed, Vicky articulated a parent's role as including an
obligation to ensure and protect `the wellbeing' not only of current family members, but also
of future relatives. In enacting familial responsibility, these mothers had a role in shaping
their extended families as well as their immediate one, through their management of genetic
information and personal reproductive decisions.
Our discussion to this point has centred on monitoring aspects of genetic risk and
reproductive responsibility for oneself and one's family. However, these mothers'
experiences of genetic and reproductive responsibility also included a complex negotiation
of doubts, tensions and allegiances.
Conflicted reflections
As the above examples illustrate, the majority of women made personal decisions not to
have more biological children after finding out that they carried the FX gene. However, in
3Although we do not have conclusive data for the entire sample, pregnancy termination does not appear to have been a commonly
used method by these women to avoid passing on the FX gene. Out of the 17 women who talked about their use of prenatal testing,
five terminated following a positive result, while six continued a positive result pregnancy.
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discussing their decisions in retrospect, some also voiced concerns and ambivalence about
the implications of their choices. In arriving at this decision mothers had to adjust deep-
seated desires and values (see also Raspberry and Skinner 2010). They found themselves
revising their reproductive imaginaries to fit their new reproductive circumstances, but often
not without some distress and conflict. Carrie underscored these tensions when she reflected
on how having two sons with FXS had impacted on her:
I think the largest thing that has really affected me, just me, is the fact that my
husband has always wanted a lot of children. And you know we have the two. […]
So that's the biggest thing because you know you're carrying it and you think, `Well
if he had married someone else, he could have had a houseful of kids'.
Carrie's account of her experience, and the divergence in the reproductive path taken and
that imagined, convey the contradiction that many women grappled with after finding out
their carrier status. On the one hand, Carrie articulated the difficulty of letting go of the
vision of having many children, but on the other, she was equally clear that she would not
risk passing on the FX gene to make a bigger family.
Some women, while resolute about their own choice not to have more children, indicated
they would not impose this on others, recognising different notions of what is responsible
behaviour and `doing what's right'. Rachel, whose only child had FXS, refused to judge
women who consciously take the risk of passing on the gene, though she personally would
not do so. She explained, `And there are people out there that wouldn't mind, that I know
have just gone ahead and had kids, and if they have fragile X, that's great. If they don't,
great. But I'm not at that point, and I don't know if I ever will be'. In her reluctance to
criticise women who chose to follow reproductive paths that she could not imagine for
herself, Rachel acknowledged that there were diverse ways of enacting responsibility,
perhaps different from her own, but equally valid.
Another tension in some women's accounts was their recognition that by not reproducing or
in some cases using tests and technology to select against children like the ones they already
had, they might be viewed as devaluing lives of individuals with disabilities. One mother's
account particularly encapsulates this conflict. While Diane resolved not to have more
children after her three sons were diagnosed with FXS, at the same time she expressed
unease about the possible societal consequences of such genetic testing-based choices over
time. Her concerns led her to envision a future in which individuals increasingly base
reproductive decisions on their potential genetic predispositions for disorders, and in so
doing create a society where `special children' are not wanted. She explained:
And the idea being: `Why should I have a disabled child when I can make a
princess', and this whole sort of genetic realisation and manipulation of our culture.
Like I have a couple friends who – I think they have like a 20 per cent chance of
passing on a gene that has something to do with the nervous system or muscular
system, and they decided not to have kids. They're going to adopt, and I'm like
`Hey, adoption's great and everything'. But it's going to get to a point where if
people are predisposed to a certain gene and they know about it, they're not going
to have those kids, or they're going to go in vitro, and so in a way a lot of these
special kids like our kids I think will be sort of taken out of Western culture
countries.
Diane speculated that with increased availability of genetic testing, more people will choose
not to risk passing on a genetic disorder, or even a genetic predisposition. She worried that a
predominance of such genetically based reproductive choices could ultimately result in less
tolerance and acceptance for difference, a possibility that seemingly follows from a risk-
management version of being a responsible genetic citizen. The tensions evident in her
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account and those of other women who decided not to have biological children indicate that
a risk-management-based notion of genetic responsibility does not encapsulate the
complexities that arise in practice. To further illustrate the varied dimensions and
interpretations of what it means to be genetically responsible, we now turn to the
experiences of mothers who knowingly chose to risk passing on the gene in order to have
biological children.
Choosing reproduction
Twenty-two women consciously decided to have a baby after finding out that they had a 50
per cent chance of passing on the FX gene with each pregnancy. These mothers refused to
choose not to have the families they had imagined raising with their partners before they
knew they were carriers. Their accounts of why they made this decision reveal how they
incorporated different senses of what was responsible and moral behaviour in the light of
genetic information.
This group of 22 women does not include the few families who initiated or continued a
pregnancy with the intent of using prenatal testing and terminating if results came back
positive for FXS, nor does it include the two families who used assisted reproductive and
genetic technology techniques to conceive and continue a non-affected pregnancy.4 Ten of
the 22 women planned a non-mediated pregnancy, willing to risk having an affected child.
The other 12 decided to continue an unplanned non-mediated pregnancy. While differing in
this respect, the two groups spoke similarly of why they went ahead with their `risky'
pregnancies. Both groups knew and accepted that they had a 50 per cent chance of having a
child who would either be a carrier of or have fragile X syndrome.5
Overall, the mothers who chose to continue planned and unplanned `risk' pregnancies talked
about their reproductive decisions primarily in relation to a moral framework that values
parenthood and honours difference. In defending or situating the choice they made to risk
having a child with FXS, these 22 mothers explicitly constructed responsibility within this
context of valuing a child's `specialness' and the importance of family. For example, Lynn,
who decided to have a second child after her first son's diagnosis of FXS, and subsequently
gave birth to another son with FXS, expressed a sentiment commonly shared among these
mothers: `And as far as I'm concerned, a child with a disability is no less of a worthy person
to live'. Similarly, Beverly, a mother of five children, also reflected that she deliberately
chose to have more children in part to emphasise that she did not negatively value her first
two children who had FXS. Beverly saw her reproductive choices as testament to the value
and beauty of all her children, despite sensing public disapproval of her actions. She related:
`He's a beautiful kid. They're beautiful and I mean that's why I went on to have more kids.
We get a lot of criticism for that'. Like Beverly, other women sensed or were confronted
with societal censure for acting irresponsibly by knowingly taking the risk of having a child
with intellectual disability, and they responded with their own accounts of what constituted
responsible and moral acts (see also Landsman 2003, 1998 for discussion of reproductive
choices and valuing the personhood of `less-than-perfect' children).
4This group of 22 women does not include three mothers who explicitly stated that they used prenatal testing with a planned or
unplanned pregnancy in order to avoid passing on the FX gene, nor does it include the two mothers who successfully used ART to
have an unaffected child. Three of the four women who knew their carrier status before having children are counted in this group of 22
mothers. Two chose to have two children, one woman adopted, then continued an unplanned pregnancy. The fourth woman who knew
she was a carrier is not in this group because she is one of the two women who used ART to avoid passing on the gene (she used IVF
with PGD to have three children, due to a lab error her first child has full mutation FXS).
5The 22 women who continued planned and unplanned unmediated pregnancies gave birth to a total of 31 children, 20 were born with
the FX gene. Of the 10 mothers who planned a `risk' pregnancy, three of them did so twice, and two of these three subsequently
continued unplanned pregnancies. Of the 12 women who continued unplanned pregnancies (this does not include the two who first
planned a pregnancy), two women did so twice.
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These women did not experience knowledge of carrier status as an imperative not to
reproduce, nor as a basis on which to calculate genetic risk. Instead they enacted forms of
responsibility predicated on valuing difference and investing in parenthood. For example,
Catherine explained that she and her husband's commitment to expand their family
outweighed the risk of having another child with FXS:
We decided to have another child. Went through the whole PGD process. That
didn't work. So we just decided that it was important for [son] to have a sibling
regardless, and if we had two kids with fragile X, then at least they would have
each other. That's kind of how we looked at it. So we decided to do that'.
Catherine, whose second son did not inherit the FX gene, framed her and her husband's
decision to have another child as a conscious evaluation of what was best for their family:
giving their son a brother or a sister.
In talking about their roles as mothers, these women also emphasised the importance they
attached to being their children's best advocates as well as being the best parent possible in
an array of situations. For some, an enhanced sense of life purpose or fulfilment came out of
these parenting and advocacy efforts. Karen, who chose to have two more children after the
first was diagnosed, conceptualised her role as mother to three children with FXS as a
positive one: `There was a purpose that I was supposed to fulfil that I wasn't fulfilling and I
was given my children to help me become the person that I'm supposed to be'. Like other
mothers, Karen saw herself as an advocate for her children, and further reflected that the
presence of FXS in her family made her feel `a greater responsibility to be a good parent'.
This construction of being a `good parent' often also included knowing one's parental limits,
and being aware of emotional and financial restraints on having more children. Lynn also
defined her reproductive choices as based on her abilities to be a good parent and the value
she placed on all children: `I mean it didn't keep us from having another child. We did know.
It's not that we felt that a child with special needs is not a worthy human being. It's just you
do as a parent needs to be able to provide what they need'. Lynn decided to have a second
child only after making a personal calculation that she could responsibly parent two children
even if they both had FXS. The decision to risk having another child with FXS was made by
balancing a calculation of available financial and emotional resources with a privileging of
motherhood and wanting more children.
These accounts indicate that women who continued to have children did not talk about
obligations to manage risk, but rather explicitly situated and described their decision to have
children within a framework of choice, affirmation, and love. Like their counterparts who
stopped reproducing, these mothers did not make their decision lightly. It is important to
note also that these women's knowledge of the risk of transmitting FXS was not different
from the women who did not have another biological child (see Raspberry and Skinner
2010), nor did they express different feelings of self-blame or guilt associated with being a
carrier (see Skinner and Raspberry 2010). Nor did we find any significant differences in age,
education, income, ethnicity, religious affiliation, or religiosity between the women who
stopped reproducing and those who continued.6
On the other hand, there are identifiable differences in how these women talked about their
choices to have another biological child. While all the mothers in this study emphasised the
6A statistician ran t-tests comparing the two groups. All differences were nonsignificant. In a paper based on interview data from
women in the same study, Michie and Skinner (2010) concluded that the majority of mothers used a religious framework in talking
about their children having FXS, with some explicitly saying it was a part of God's plan and purpose for their lives. While religious
faith and practice clearly played a role in how mothers in this study talked about their children, there were no significant differences in
religious affiliations nor in the degree of religiosity between women who chose not to have more children and those who had more
biological children with unmediated pregnancies.
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unconditional love they felt for their children with FXS, women who continued to reproduce
talked about this choice by referencing a framework of values of motherhood and family as
integral to their understandings of being responsible. For these 22 mothers, particular
dimensions of responsibility were more salient than others, and genetic responsibility did not
primarily revolve around whether to risk passing on a gene or not. Through their choices,
actions, and discourse these women enacted and emphasised different facets of being
responsible which included affirmation of the worthiness of all children, valuation of
`difference', investment in parenthood and family, a sense of increased empowerment and
life purpose, and an awareness of emotional and financial limits to parenting. It is notable
that many of these themes were also raised by the women in this study who decided not to
have more biological children. However, those mothers were more likely to discuss the
value and important of their children and family while describing their child's characteristics
and development, or in relation to everyday circumstances. In contrast, the women who
continued to reproduce brought up these themes in the context of talking about responsibility
and why they made the reproductive decisions they did.
In summary, for the women who continued to reproduce, `doing the right thing' was defined
within a framework that extended beyond risk calculations of transmitting a genetic
disorder. In rejecting a prescriptive construction of themselves as genetically at-risk
individuals, these women instead emphasised their social roles as mothers and advocates for
their families and communities. They framed themselves as responsible actors within a
discourse that encompassed love and appreciation for their children, a rejection of value
distinctions between those with disabilities and those without, feelings of increased
empowerment and life purpose, and a heightened awareness of their own parenting strengths
and limits.
Conclusion
Diagnosis of an inheritable condition reveals health information of consequence not just for
the individual but for kin through the generations. While other studies have documented the
complex nature of genetic responsibility, constructions of genetic responsibility based
primarily on risk management suggest that the responsible individual is one who would
choose not to `roll the dice' and chance passing on a condition such as FXS (Ekberg 2007,
Hallowell 1999, Novas and Rose 2000). The majority of women in this study indicated
through their accounts of their reproductive trajectories that they were constructing
themselves in line with this notion of the `good genetic citizen' as one who does not engage
in `risky reproduction', and who through disciplining the self and family contributes to the
wellbeing and health of society. They `did the right thing' by choosing not to have another
biological child who could carry the gene. They also performed what they saw as their moral
obligation to disclose genetic information to relatives, thereby possibly shaping the kinds of
families they would reproduce. At the same time, these women's accounts also reveal the
conflicts and ambivalences that arise in enacting this circumscribed form of responsibility as
they reconciled desires to have more children with a sense of oneself as genetically at-risk.
Some of them voiced tensions engendered by the intersection of contrary societal stances: a
sense of being censured and criticized if they passed on a gene known to cause intellectual
disability, as well as concerns that the nature of their choice, if extended and endorsed more
broadly by others, could have societal consequences of reducing the number of children who
have genetic problems or predispositions for undesired characteristics, and thus lead to a
devaluing of individuals with disabilities or imperfections.
Paediatric genetic testing was used to determine the children's and mothers' FX status (i.e.
full mutation for the former and either full mutation or carrier status for the latter), and the
genetic information resulting from these diagnostic tests was powerful for shaping most
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families' subsequent reproductive decisions. However, very few families used prenatal
testing for selective purposes. In this regard they were similar to families of affected
children in Kelly's (2009) study who chose not to put themselves in the position of having to
decide whether to terminate a pregnancy based on prenatal testing. By not getting pregnant,
they circumvented the biomedical interventions and moral dilemmas involved in making
that choice. Those families who had more children through unmediated pregnancies present
an interesting counterpart to the argument that the availability of genetic testing leads to a
liberal eugenics (Duster 2003). In respecting and investing in difference within their own
families, these mothers add their unique voices to debates over `appropriate' uses of genetic
testing and risk information. These mothers' multifaceted accounts, like those reported for
example in Downing (2005), Kelly (2009), and Rapp (1999), underscore the point that
whether or not to have children is not a straightforward decision based on circumscribed
notions of genetic risk and responsibility, but rather involves a complex negotiation of
personal desires, family values and diversity, religious faith, and financial constraints. The
stories told by women who chose not to have more children as well as those who did,
evocatively attest to the complexity of reproductive decision making in the context of
inheritable conditions.
One of the strengths of this study is the relatively large sample homogeneous by type of
genetic disorder but diverse by race, education, income and region. That we found no
differences in these factors between those who did not risk having another child with FXS
and those who had more biological children without the use of reproductive and genetic
technologies, suggests that the difference between these two groups is how responsibility is
reckoned—with risk management as priority for the non-reproducers and other notions of
responsibility for those who had more children.
Our focus on how women who know they carry the gene for FXS make reproductive choices
and construct themselves as responsible social actors provides evidence for the nuanced
ways in which genetic responsibility is enacted in everyday situations by those who have
experience with a specific genetic condition. It is likely that these enactments would be
somewhat different in families who have other types of inherited conditions. Variations in
inheritance patterns, uncertainties of probabilities and prognosis, and level of severity of
associated characteristics make a difference in how carriers think about and act upon
reproductive decisions. While raising a child with FXS may present challenges and stressors
for a family (Bailey et al. 2008, Wheeler et al. 2008) and for some include the stigma
associated with intellectual disability, these challenges are probably experienced as less
disruptive than those that accompany other inherited diseases, such as Tay-Sachs, which
brings profound suffering and early death. While most families would not purposely choose
that their child has FXS, they speak about loving all their children and the joy and sense of
purpose that having a child with FXS brings to their lives (see Michie and Skinner 2010),
and so for some families, the possibility of having another child with FXS is not a reason not
to have more children. In addition, the `manageability' of living with FXS makes it more
probable that some families will risk passing on this gene, while they might be less likely to
do so in cases of a fatal genetic disorder, an issue for further research.
To conclude, we suggest that the ways that these women construct themselves as responsible
mothers provide evidence of the complex and dynamic ways that genetic responsibility is
enacted and requires a refashioning of this notion to be inclusive of a variety of values and
the inherent ambivalences of being a genetic citizen.
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